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[L. A. No. 20433. In Bank. May 4, 1948.] 
ELIZABETH SEBRELL, Appellant, v. LOS ANGELES 
RAILWAY CORPORATION (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1] Negligencc-lnstructions.-In an action for injuries sustained 
by a motorist as the result of a collision of her automobile and 
a streetcar, an instruction that the jury should not consider 
the question of injuries or damages prior to determining the 
issue of liability could reasonably be understood as requiring 
the jury merely to separate in its deliberations the question of 
injuries and damages from the question of liability, and did 
not eonfliet with a further instruetion that a grievously injured 
person losing her memory was entitled to the presumption 
that she exercised reasonable eare, since the jury eould not 
reasonably doubt from such instructions that it could eon-
sider plainti1f's injuries in determining whether she suffered 
a loss of memory. 
[2] Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Conficting Instruc-
tions.-Instruetions th.1t are eontradictory in essential ele-
ments may warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground 
that it cannot be ascertained whieh instruetion was followed 
by the jury. 
[3] ld.-Harmless Error-Instructions-Oon1ticting Instructions. 
-In determining whether there is such a conflict in the ip-
struetions that it cannot be ascertained which instruction 
was followed by the jury, the decisive question is whether the 
instruetions read as a whole and in the light of the cireum-
stanees of the ease in which they were given, are apt to con-
. fuse a person of ordinary intelligence. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Frank 
G. Swain, Judge. Judgment affirmed; appeal from order dis-
missed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained in a collision of 
an automobile and a streetcar. Judgment for defendant 
affirmed. 
[31 See 2 Cal.Jur. 1027; 24 Cal.Jur. 820; 53 Am.Jur. 440. 
licK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 180; {2, 3] Appeal 
and Error, § 1641. 
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Forrest .A. Betts for Appellant. 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Sherman Welpton, Jr., for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintifi appeals from a judgment entered 
on a jury verdict for defendant in an action for damages for i 
injurie~ to person and property sustained in a collision be-
tween her automobile and a streetcar owned by defendant. 
Plaintiff's automobile, proceeding south on New Hampshire 
A venue in Los Angeles, and ,defendant's streetcar, proceeding 
west on Sixth Street, collided at the intersection. A boulevard ' 
stop sign on the northwest corner of the intersection of the two 
st.reets requires southbound vehicl~s on New Hampshire Ave-
nue to stop before crossing Sixth Street. There are no stop 
signs on Sixth Street requiring vehicles approaching New 
Hampshire .A venue to stop. Plaintiff testified that she made 
the required stop and carefully looked to her right and left; , 
that t.he intersection is a blind intersection j that she did not ' 
see the streetcar or any" moving traffic" on Sbcth Street j and 
that she remembers" nothing at all" from the time she brought 
her automobile to a stop until after the collision, since in-
juries from the collision deprived her of any memory of the 
events related to the accident. The strl!etcar operator testified 
that he could not see north on New Hampshire Avenue until 
he was within a distance of a few feet from the intersection; 
that when he was 10 or 15 feet from the east curb line of New 
Hampshire Avenue, he first saw plaintiff's automobile travel-
ing at a speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour; that plaintiff crossed 
the white line on New Hampshire Avenue, at which south-
bound vehicles were required to stop, and never applied the 
brakes; that he applied the emergency brake as quickly as he 
could j that the front of the streetcar collided with the door 
of the automobile on the side where plaintiff was sitting; that 
plaintiff did not vary her speed after he first saw her or "look 
up" before the streetcar struck the automobile j that he rang 
the bell intermittently while he was proceeding on Sixth 
Street, and that" I am pretty sure I rang it as fast as I could 
ring it when I seen danger." Other witnesses testified that 
they heard the streetcar bell ringing before the accident 
occurred. One of the streetcar passengers testified that as it 
approached the scene of the accident the :.:t.rl!ctcar proceeded 
at a spp.ed of approximately 20 miles per hour; that she first 
saw plaintiff's automobile when it was approximately 10 feet 
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north of the boulevard .. 'top Rign; that it looked C C like it 
v .. ould come throu~h the stop sign and strike" her; that the 
automobile did not fltop hefore entering the intersection; 
thnt she f(>lt the strcetcar slow down a little when the brllk~s 
wcrc applied. 
[1] P1aintiff docs not contend that the verdict W:lS not 
supported by the evidence. The sole issue on appeal is rnised 
by her contention that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in instructing the jury. The jury was instructed: "I 
instruct you that it would be a violation of your duty as jurors 
to consider the question of injuries ordnml\~es, it any, prior 
to determining the issue of liability or to allow the question 
of injuries or uamages, if any, to affect jour judgment in any 
W:l.Y in determining the issue of liability. The first question 
for you to decide is whether or not thc plaintiff is entitled 
to recover in this action lU'!'ainst the defendant. If you :find 
from the evidl!nce that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then 
it is your duty to Dmllediatcly return the verdict in favor of 
said clefl!Udant." The jury was also instructed: "It is the 
tcstimony of plaintiff in this case that she does not recollect 
DllY event related to the accident, and th:l.t her last recollec-
tion is that of ha,ing brought her automobile to a stop with 
the front end. of it appro:x:i.mntely even with the boulevard 
stop sign which is located at the northwest corller of the inter-
section. A person who h:t.S been RO grievously injured in an 
accident as to be deprived of her memory io; entitled to the 
presumption that she exercised reasonable care for her own 
protection. • . ." 
Plaintiff contends that the :first instruetion withhcld from 
the jury the right to consider plaintiff's injuries in determin-
ing the issue of liability, and therefore conflicted with the 
instruction that the jury consider whether as a result of her 
injuries plaintiff had been deprived of hcr memory aud was 
thus entitled to the presumption that she exercised reasonable 
care for her o'vn protection. The latter instruction directl·d 
the jury to considcrplainti1f's injuries in determining liability 
for thl! question whether her injuries rcsu1ted in a 10Sli of 
memory ('ntitlin:r hl!'r to the pr(l!;umption wa.c; a ruaterial iRSue 
cOnel!rlrll1~ liability. Plnintiff contends that thl! conflict be-
tween th(' instructions Rubstantially nffectcd her right to the 
presumption that she exercised reasollable eare for her own 
protection. She rellcs on Simmons v. Lamb, 35 Cal.App.2d 
109 [94 P.2d 814], in which the jury was instrucu.'<i "that 
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it wouM be a violation of your duty as jurors to discuss the 
nature and e:\.-tent of plaintiff's injuries, if any, until you 
shall have first determined the question of whether or not the 
defendant is liable. The question of liability should first be 
determined by you before it would be proper for you in any 
wise to discuss the nature and extent of the plaintiff's in-
juries, if any, because unless the defendant is liable, the 
nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, shall not 
enter into your deliberations." In that case it was important 
for the determination of the issue of liability whether the 
plaintiff or her allegedly intoxicated companion was driving 
the plaintiff's automobile when it collided with the defendants' 
truck. As to that question the defendants relied on the fact 
that flesh, blood, and hair, which according to the nature of 
the injuries of the plaintiff were likely to be hers, were found 
on the broken windshield in front of the place where a pas-
senger would be sitting. The District Court of Appeal held 
that, although in some cases the instruction as given would 
be proper, "[N] evertheless, in the circumstances here pre-
sented, it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury not to 
consider the nature and extent of respondent's injuries until 
they had determined the question of liability therefor. Before 
the jury could decide whether respondent or appellants were 
responsible for the collision, it was necessary to determine 
whether respondent or her companion , . , was driving the 
Chevrolet, and in order to do that, it was necessary for the 
jurors to consider the nature and extent of respondent's in-
juries." (35 Cal.App.2d 113.) 
In the present case the jury was not instructed as it was 
in Simmons v. Lamb, supra, that the issue of liability sllould 
first be determined "before it would be proper for you in 
any wise to discuss the nature and extent of the plaintiff'" 
injuries," or that "unless the defendant is liable, the nature 
and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, if any, shall not enter 
into your deliberations." The jury was instructed that they 
should not" consider the question of injuries or damages, if 
any, prior to determining the issue of liability, or to allow 
the question of injuries or damages, if auy, to affect your 
judgment in any way in determining the issue of liability," 
(Italics added.) This instruction in effect advised the jury 
that they should not assume that defendant was negligent and 
pass immediately to a discussion of the question of damages 
and that they should not be swayed by sympathy or sentiment 
) 
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because of the injuries in determining the issue of liability. 
The in~truction could reasonably be understood a~ requiring 
the jury l)lerely to separate in its deliberations the question 
of injuries and damages from the question of liability. Such 
separation of the two distinct issues in the deliberations of 
the jury could be observed even though the jury would have 
to cousider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether she 
suffered a loss of memory entitling her to the presumption. 
If the two instructions are read together, it is clear the jury 
could not reasonably doubt that it could consider plaintiff's 
injuries in determining whether plaintiff suffered the loss of 
memory on which her right to the presumption depended. 
In the Simmons case the instruction withholding from the 
jury consideration of plaintiff's injuries in determining the 
issue of liability Rtood alone; it was not supplemented by an 
instruction requiring the jury to consider the injuries sus-
tained by plaintiff in determining whether the plaintiff or 
her companion was driving the plaintiff's automobile when 
the collision occurred. Thus, the jury was precluded from 
considering the injuries of the plaintiff even for the purpose 
of determining who was driving the plaintiff's automobile 
at the time of the accident. In that case there was therefore 
no problem as to conflicting instructions, whereas in the 
present case the question is whether there is such a conflict 
between the two instructions in question that the jury could 
reasonably doubt that it was entitled to follow the instruction 
requiring it to consider plaintiff's injuries in determining 
whether she suffered a loss of memory. 
[2] Instructions that are contradictory in essential ele-
ments may warrant the reversal of a judgment on the ground 
that it cannot be ascertained which instruction was followed 
by the jury. (Chidester v. Consolidated People's Ditch 00., 
53 Cal. 56, 58; Starr v. Los Angeles Ra~1way 00., 187 Cal. 270, 
280 [201 P. 599]; Soda v. Marriot, 118 Cal.App. 635, 643 
[5 P.2d 675].) [3] In determining whether there is such 
a conflict the decisive question is whether the instructions 
read as a whole and in the light of the circumstances of the 
case in which they were given, are apt to confuse a person of 
ordinary intelligence. It is common knowledge that instruc-
tions, like statutes, may include in addition to a general 
rule a special rUle applicable only in particular circumstances 
and that the special rule qualifiE'.s the general. (See, Civ. 
Code, § 3534; Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; JJasset v. Nascimiento, 
I 
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108 Cal.App. 14, 19 [291 P. 269].) In the present case the 
instruction relating to the presumption required the jury to 
consider a particular consequence of plaintiff's injurie:s for 
the purpose specified in the instruction. No explicit state-
ment was necessary to make a person of ordinary intelligence 
understand that a consideration of plaintiff's injuries in con-
formity with this instruction would not violate the general ' 
instruction that the jury determine the question of liability . 
before it considered the question of injuries or damages. 
The judgment is affirmed and the appeal from the order 
denying a new trial is dismissed. 
Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
GIBSON, C. J.-I concur in the judgment. Although in 
my opinion the instructions could have more clearly stated 
the principles of law involved, it does not appear that there 
has been a miscarria.ge of justice in this case. 
Shenk, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
By a process of finespun legalistic reasoning the majority 
has arrived at the conclusion that there is no conflict in the 
instructions which, in effect, tell the jury that it must or must 
not consider certain evidence. No amount of verbiage, how-
ever artistically arranged, can erase this conflict. It is 80 
apparent "that he may run that readeth it." 
The majority opinion does not set forth the criticized in-
structions in the order in which they appear in the transcript. 
It places the instructions in reverse order without comment 
as to the order in which they were read to the jury or the 
space of time which elapsed between the reading of the two 
instructions. The record discloses that the instructions given 
by the court to the jury covered 36 pages of the transcript. 
They commence at page 201 and end on page 237. Plaintiff's 
instruction No. 51 ·appears at page 205 and is as follows: 
"It is the testimony of the plaintiff in this ca.'le that she does 
not recollect any event related to the accident, and that her 
last recollection is that of having brought her automobile 
to a stop with the front end of it approximately even with 
the boulevard stop sign, which is located at the northwest 
corner of the intersection. A person who has been so griev-
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ously injured in an accident as to be depriv~d of her mcmory 
is entitled to the presumption that she exercised reasonable 
care for hcr OVIIl protection. This is a rebuttable presump-
tion, but is one to which the plaintiff is entitled to have you 
give cOn.<;ideration at all points in the ca.o:;e, fUld ev~n unto 
the deliberation in the jury room." The instruction which 
is said to conflict with the foregoing instruction is defend-
ant's instruction No. XI and it appears in the trnru;cript at 
page 231. It is as follows: "I instruct you that it would be 
a violation of your duty as jurors to consider the question of 
injuries or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue 
of liability or to allow the question of injuries or damages, 
if any, to affect your judgment in any way in determining 
the issue of liability. The first question for you to decide is 
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this ac-
tion against the defendant. If you find from the evidence 
that plaintiff is not entitled to recover, then it is your duty 
to immediately return a verdict in favor of said defendant." 
So it appears from the record that after reading to the 
jury plaintiff's instruction No. 51 above quoted, the court 
read some 26 pages of other instructions befor~ coming to 
defendant's instruction No. XI. After reading six more 
pages of instructions, the case was submitted to the jury. 
To those who have had experience in the trial of jury cases 
the foregoing procedure is a matter of considerable signifi-
cance. Even a trained legal mind cannot retain t1!e phrase-
ology contained in plaintiff's instruction No. 51 while listening 
to some 26 pages of other instructions and differentiate its 
phraseology from that contained in defendant's instruction 
No. XI. Even if the two instructions had been read in con-
secutive order, they would have been confusing and mislead-
ing. But when we consider the fact that defendant '8 
instruction No. XI was read to the jury near the end of the 
charge, and after 26 pages of other instructions had been read 
sinee the reading of plaintiff's instruction No; 51, it presents 
a picture, which anyone familiar with the modus operandi 
of a jury trial would say, was very unfavorable to plaintiff's 
case. 
Without giving any consideration to the foregoing factual 
situation, the majority opinion states: "The jury was in-
structed that they should not' consider the question of injurie, 
or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue of liability 
or to allow the question of injuries or damages, if any, to 
) 
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aft'cct your judgment in any way in dctermining the issue of 
liability.' (Italics added.) This instruction in eft'ect advised 
the jury that they should not assume that defendant was 
negligent and pass immediately to a discussion of the question 
of damages and that they should not be swayed by sympathy 
or sentiment because of the injuries in determining the issue 
of liability. The instruction could reasonably be understood 
as requiring the jury merely to separate in its deliberations ' 
the question of injuries and damages from the question of 
liability. Such separation of the two distinct issues in the 
deUberations of the jury could be observed even though the 
jury would have to consider plaintiff's injuries in determi-n-
ing whether she suffered a loss of memory entitling her to 
the presumption. If the two instructions are read together, 
it is clear the jury could not reasonably doubt that it could 
consider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether plaintiff 
suffered the loss of memory on which her right to the pre-
sumption depended." [Emphasis added.] The absurdity 
of the reasoning in the majority opinion stands out boldly 
when it is observed that the author found it necessary to 
emphasize the finespun distinction between the phrases 
"question of injuries and damages" and "issue of liability." 
One who has had experience in the trial forum knows that 
the only opportunity the juror has to consider an instruction 
is when he listens to it as it is read to the jury by the trial 
judge. Even without such experience or unusual imagina- ' 
tive powers, ordinary common sense should dictate that the 
reasoning in the above-quoted excerpt is so highly fallacious 
and unsound that it amounts to an utter absurdity. Further-
more, the premise for such reasoning is false. There is not 
the slightest intimation in the instruction in question to the 
effect "that [the jury] should not be swayed by sympathy 
or sentiment because of the injuries in determining the issue 
of liability." This statement in the majority opinion is with-
out foundation in fact and is indicative of the absurd lengths 
to which the majority is willing to go in order to find support 
for its unsound and illogical conclusion. The opinion then 
states that: "The instruction could reasonably be understood 
as requiring the jury merely to separate in its deUberations 
the question of injuries and damages from the question of 
liab~1ity." [Emphasis added.] Anyone who has had ex-
. perience in the trial of jury cases knows that the suggested 
requirement is far beyond the capacity of the average juror 
) 
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evcn in cases where the instructions are clear and explicit 
and beyond the realm of conflict. From the discussion in 
the majority opinion on this proposition it is obvious that 
no consideration has been given to the practical aspects of a 
jury trial. The majority opinion further states: "Such sep-
aration of the two distinct issues in the deliberations of the 
jury could be observed even though the jury would have to 
consider plaintiff's injuries in determining whether she 
suffered a loss of memory entitling her to the presumption." 
The majority opinion makes this statement notwithstanding 
the clear, positive and explicit statement in the instruction 
that: "1 instruct you that it would be a 'Violation of your duty 
as jurors to consider the question of injuries or damages, if 
any, prior to determining the issue of liability or to allow the 
question of injuries or damages, if any, to affect your judg-
ment in any way in determining the issue of Ziabt1ity." [Em-
phasis added.] I do not believe that it is possible on any 
basis of reason or common sense to reconcile the portion of 
the instruction just quoted with the last quoted statement 
in the majority opinion. To say that the jury would not be 
misled by such an instruction in a case of this character is, 
in my opinion, altogether too much to expect of the average 
juror. I believe, however, that the average juror is a person 
of ordinary intelligence, and, in my opinion, a person of 
ordinary intelligence would understand from these instruc-
tions that he should not consider the nature or extent of the 
injuries suffered by plaintiff until he determined that defend-
ant was liable for such injuries. In other words, he could not 
consider the effect of plaintiff's injuries in determining 
whether defendant was guilty of negligence which was the 
proximate cause of the accident, or whether plaintiff. was 
guilty of contributory negligence which proximately con-
tributed thereto. Therefore, he could not consider plaintiff's 
injuries as causing unconsciousness or lack of memory which 
would entitle her to the presumption that she exercised or-
dinary care for her own protection until he had determined, 
independent of the presumption, that defendant was guilty 
of negligence and that plaintiff was not. Of course, this view 
of the instructions would deprive plaintiff of the benefit of 
the presumption that she exercised ordinary care. 
It should be remembered that defendant's instruction No. 
XI was read to the jury long after the reading of plaintiff's 
instruction No. 51, and just before the case was submitted 
) 
822 SEBRELL tI. Los ANGELES Rv. CORP. [31 C.2d 
to the jury. By such procedure the last command of the trial 
judge was that the jury must not "consider the question of 
injuries or damages, if any, prior to determining the issue of 
liability or to allow the question of injuries or damages, if 
any, to a1Iect your judgment in any way in determining the 
issue of liability." With this command in their ears as they 
retired to deliberate, it is not probable that the members of 
the jury gave any consideration to plaintiff's instruction No. i 
51 which advised them that they could consider plaintiff's 
injuries in determining whether she exercised reasonable care 
for her own protection. Without giving pla~ntiff the benent . 
of this presulllPtion, the jury may well have concluded that 
she and not the defendant was guilty of the negligence which 
was the proximate cause of the accident. All this the majority 
has failed to consider. It contents itself with groundless, 
theoretical assumptions which are wholly lacking in reality 
or practical considerations in the technique of jury trials. 
The appeal of this case was :6.rst heard and determined 
by the District Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Three, and a decision was rendered therein reversing 
the judgment upon the sole ground that the above-mentioned 
instructions \vere so conflicting that they constituted preju-
dicial error. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal 
was prepared by Mr. Justice Parker Wood and was concurred 
in by Acting Presiding Justice Clement L. Shinn and Justice 
pro tern. Clarence L. Kincaid. This opinion is so logical and 
well reasoned that I am constrained to adopt the following 
portion thereof, which discussed the problems here involved, 
ns a part of this dissent: I 
"The court instructed the jury, at the request of defendant, 
'that it would be a violation of your duty as jurors to eon-
sider the question of injuries or damages, if any, prior to 
determining the issue of liability or to allow the question of 
injuries or damages, if any, to affect your judgment in any 
way in determining the issue of liability.' Prior to giving 
that instruction, the coUrt had instructed the jury, at the 
request of plaintiff, as follows: 'It. is the testimony of the 
plaintiff in this case that she does not recollect any event 
related to the accident, and that her last recollection is that 
of having brought her automobile to a stop with the front 
end of it approximately even with the boulevard stop sign, 
¥ bich is located at the northwest corner of the intersection. 
A person who has been so grievously injured in an accident 
) 
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as to be deprived of her memory is entitled to the presumption 
t.hat she exercised reasonable care for her own protection. 
That is a rebuttable presumption, but is one to which the plain-
tiff is entitled to have you give consideration at all poin~ in 
the case and even unto the deliberation in the jury room.' 
The evidence on behalf of plaintiff, under plaintiff's theory 
of the case that she was entitled to such presumption, was 
sufficient to justify the giving of the last-quoted instruction. 
The effect of that instruction was that if the jury found that 
plaintiff had been injured to the extent that she had been 
deprived of her memory she was entitled to the presumption 
that she exercised reasonable care. In other words, the jury 
was directed that it should consider plaintiff's injuries in 
order to determine whether the presumption should be applied 
in plaintiff's behalf. Such a presumption is a form of evi-
dence, and, if applicable herein, it would, of course, be evi-
dence on the question of liability. It therefore appears that 
the jury was instructed in effect to consider the injuries of 
plaintiff in determining the question of liability. As shown 
by the other instruction, first above quoted, the jury was in-
structed that it should not consider the question of plaintiff's 
injuries in any way in determining the issue of liability, 
Those two instructions were conflicting. According to plain-
tiff's theory of the case, namely, that by reason of her personal 
injuries she did not remember what happened after she made 
the boulevard stop, the question as to whether the facts were 
such that she was entitled to the presumption that she exer-
cised reasonable care for her· own protection was an important 
and material issue concerning liability. The conflict in those 
instructions pertained to a material matter, namely, 8.l5 to 
whether the personal injuries of plaintiff should have been 
considered by the jury in determining the question of liability. 
It cannot be ascertained, of course, which instruction was 
followed by the jury. The giving of those instructions was 
prejudieiaUy erroneous. 
"In the case of Simmons v. Lamb, 35 Cal.App.2d 109 [94 
P .2d 814], it was held to be prejudicial error to give an in-
struction that 'it would be a violation of your duty as jurors 
to discuss the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, if any, 
until you shall have first determined the question of whether 
or not the defendant is liable.' In that case material questions 
\vere: (1) whether the plaintiff or an alleged intoxicated per-
son, who was also riding in the front seat, was driving plain-
) 
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tiff's automobile when it collided with defendants' parked 
truck, from which oil pipe extended about 8 feet beyond the 
rear thereof, and (2) where the truck was standing at thc time 
of the collision. As a result of the accident therein the plain-
tiff's throat was cut from ear to ear, and there was a large· 
hole in the right side of tlle windshield, and a small hole in 
the windshield in front of the driver's seat. Plaintiff therein 
testified that she was driving the automobile, but defendants I 
argued that she was not driving 'because her throat was cut, 
and because after the accident, flesh, blood and hair were 
found on the broken windshield' in front of th~ place where 
a passenger would be sitting. There was other evidence therein 
that three of plaintiff's left ribs were broken at a place where 
the lower part of the steerinR wheel would touch her body 
if she were driving the automobile, and she testified that she 
was not cut by glass~her theory being that the oil pipe 
pierced the windshield in front of the driver's seat and cut 
her throat. There was also evidence that plaintiff's daughter, 
who was riding in the rear seat, was thrown into the front 
seat and received a cut in her scalp above the hairline; and 
that there was blood on the shoulder of the highway. The court 
said therein at page 114: 'It was therefore necessary for the 
jury to consider all of this evidence with reference to respond-
ent's injuries in order to determine whether or not she was 
driving her car at the time of the collision.' It was also said 
on that page: 'The instruction, as given, [referring to the 
instruction that the jury should not consider plaintiff's in-
juries] . . . withdrew from the consideration of the jury 
certain facts which they should have had before them when 
they fixed the liability for the accident. ' In that case, as above 
stated, plaintiff's injuries were material upon the questions 
as to who was driving the automobile and where the truck 
was standing, and those questions, of course, were material 
in determining liability. In the present case, as above stated, 
plaintiff's injuries were material upon the question as to 
whether she suffered a loss of memory to the extent that she 
would be entitled to the presumption ~hat she exercised rea-
sonable care, which question, of course, was material in de-
termining liability. 
"Appellant [respondent] herein argues that the instruction 
in Simmons v. Lamb, supra, is distinguishable from the in-
struction herein, that the instruction herein states that the 
jurors should not consider 'the question of injuries or dam-
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ages' in determining liability, whereas the instruction in the 
Simmons case states that they should not consider 'the nature 
and extent of plaintiff's injuries. Appellant [relOpondent] 
argucs further that the instruction given herein, that the 
jurors should not consider the question of injuries or damages 
in determining liability, 'is far different from instructing the 
jury that they should not consider the injuries or damages in 
determining liability,' and that under the instruction given 
herein 'the jury would certainly be at liberty to give con-
sideration to the injuries or damages in determining the 
question of liability.' The difference in meaning between thc 
expression 'the question of injuries,' and 'the nature and 
extent of injuries,' is not significant. 
"As to the matter of liability, the court instructed the jury, 
'In determining how the accident happened ... you are en-
titled to take into consideration those physical facts as are 
established by the evidence to have existed, insofar as they are 
pertinent to the accident. Such matters as the measurement 
of the highways . . . the surface thereof . . . the compara-
tive sizes of the vehicles, the physical damage done to the 
vehicles . . . the distances which the vehicles traveled or were 
knocked as a result of the accident ... also, all of such other 
physical facts as are established to your satisfaction, are mat-
ters which you may take into consideration in arriving at 
what the facts were.' It therefore appears that the court in-
structed the jury specifically that in determining liability the 
jury might consider the physical damage to property. Such 
instruction is a further indication that the court withdrew 
from the jury a consideration of plaintiff's personal injuries 
in determining liability. 
"The judgment is reversed. The appeal from the order 
denying the motion for a new trial is dismissed." 
For the foregoing reasons. 1 would reverse the judgment. 
